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Making Poverty History? 
Unequal Development Today * 
Until recently, the trend in development policy circles has been to focus on the question of poverty, and to suggest 
that inequality is interesting, but that perhaps it really does not matter. In the 2007 Wertheim Lecture, Jomo K.S. 
re-examined the role inequality plays in development and human welfare.
Jomo Kwame Sundaram
In 2005, a couple of things happened which changed the debate on the rela-
tionship of poverty to inequality. Very 
prominently, the World Bank published the 
World Development Report on the question 
of equity. Before that, the United Nations 
had published its biennial Report on the 
World Social Situation entitled The Ine-
quality Predicament. Both these volumes 
focused on the question of inequality and 
advocated equity, despite very important 
differences between the two: the World 
Bank report advocates what it calls ‘equal 
opportunity’, whereas the UN report puts 
a great deal of emphasis on the structural 
determinants of inequality in the global 
system. Nonetheless, the impact of these 
two volumes was to re-legitimise attention 
to the question of inequality. There has 
also been some very important work com-
pleted recently at the World Institute for 
Development Economic Research in Hel-
sinki on the question of wealth inequality. 
This research, a preliminary estimate on 
wealth inequality, shows that the levels of 
concentration of wealth throughout the 
world are much higher, and have been 
growing perhaps even faster, than the 
concentration of income.
Does inequality matter?
Despite these important studies and 
important findings, we find that there are 
very influential people who continue to 
insist that inequality doesn’t matter. For 
example, Professor Xavier Sala-i-Martin 
from Columbia University, who has writ-
ten a bit on the question of inequality, 
has made this kind of argument. Moises 
Naim, the former foreign minister of Ven-
ezuela, a self-proclaimed social democrat 
and editor of the influential journal Foreign 
Policy, makes a similar argument. Let me 
emphasise that income inequalities have 
undoubtedly grown very considerably over 
the last couple of centuries. It is true, of 
course, that there have been significant 
inequalities over the millennia. Economic 
historian Angus Maddison has made 
important arguments about the growth of 
inequality over the last two thousand years 
and suggests that the ratio of inequal-
ity between the richest economies and 
the poorest economies of the world was 
barely more than two to one until about 
five centuries ago. It only began to accel-
erate about two hundred years ago at the 
time of the industrial revolution - initially 
in the United Kingdom. In this regard, it’s 
important to refer to the work of the Indian 
economic historian Utsa Patnaik who has 
shown the significance of capital transfers 
from places such as the Indian subconti-
nent and the British West Indies to Britain, 
and how important such capital transfers 
were for the initial capital accumulation 
which contributed to the industrial revo-
lution. Others emphasise what might be 
called the imperialism of free trade, from 
the middle of the 19th century, after the 
industrial revolution had consolidated 
British manufacturing hegemony.
Unfortunately, there is no straightforward 
way of talking about economic and social 
inequality. Like poverty, it is multidimen-
sional and not confined to one value or 
one region. Many inequalities exist in soci-
ety and at all levels – from income, wealth 
and resources, to gender, ethnicity, access 
and opportunity. I think it is useful for us 
to remind ourselves of what people mean 
when they say they are talking about global 
inequality. For some, they are simply talk-
ing about average per capita incomes, usu-
ally national averages. Another approach 
weights national averages by population. 
So, for example, a country like China, with 
more than one billion people, would be 
weighted differently to a country like Suri-
name with its very different population 
size. This is the most common method 
being used. A third method - pioneered by 
Branko Milanovic at the World Bank - is to 
compare individual or household incomes 
globally. Because of his access to house-
hold surveys for many countries in the 
world, he has been able to estimate what 
these household incomes would look like.
Palliative or developmental aid?
There is a strong tendency to talk about 
aid and development in terms of mitigat-
ing the worst elements of poverty and 
human welfare. I would like to suggest 
that while this is certainly important from 
a humanitarian point of view, this kind of 
approach tends to be palliative. It doesn’t 
necessarily enhance the economic capaci-
ties and capabilities of the economies and 
people concerned. One must distinguish 
between these palliative approaches on 
the one hand, and a much more devel-
opmental approach on the other. There 
is now a broad consensus that no ‘one 
size fits all’, that there is no single unique 
model of development, and that what we 
really need to do is to look at the context 
in which development is to take place 
before addressing appropriate policies. A 
couple of years ago at the UN, the heads 
of government came together in Septem-
ber 2005 and committed themselves to 
formulating and implementing national 
development strategies. One might think 
this typical international rhetoric, and to 
some extent, it might well be, but its sig-
nificance is twofold: firstly, national owner-
ship of public policies, affecting develop-
ment, is not something which one should 
presume or take for granted, especially in 
many poorer and smaller countries. Most 
public policies adopted by many devel-
oping country governments are policies 
imposed upon them by the international 
financial institutions, such as the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). Secondly, the scope for all public 
policy initiatives has been very severely 
constrained by the many developments 
which have taken place in international 
economic governance, e.g. through the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) which 
is significantly different from its predeces-
sor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT). So, the ability to elaborate 
and implement truly national development 
strategies is not something which is with-
out significance. 
Let me now turn to recent trends in ine-
quality. It is quite possible, with the many 
different definitions available, for inequal-
ity to be reduced by one measure, but not 
another – e.g. by using inter-country in 
contrast to inter-household comparisons. 
There has been much higher growth in 
some countries (especially in Asia) with 
relatively large populations, most nota-
bly, China, India and Indonesia before the 
last decade. Even though you may have 
increasing inequality in each of these three 
countries, you can have overall global ine-
quality going down by various measures. 
And this is precisely what has actually hap-
pened. Overall inter-country inequalities 
have gone down because we are looking 
at national averages, rather than looking 
at the inequalities within each country. 
This might seem counterintuitive for a 
moment, but if you think carefully about it, 
it wouldn’t surprise you. Hence, for people 
like Branko Milanovic, Bob Sutcliffe and 
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others, what one can conclude about glo-
bal trends in inequality depends crucially 
on one’s definition of inequality. 
Income inequality has undoubtedly 
increased in most countries in recent dec-
ades, and for the 1990s, it has increased 
in all major groups except a few North-
ern European economies characterised 
by relatively lower inequality, and a few 
economies in the Middle East and North 
Africa with much higher inequality. For 
the rest of the world, wherever evidence is 
available, it is quite clear that intra-country 
inequality has grown. What has this meant 
for human welfare? Growth during the last 
two decades of the 20th century (for which 
we have data) has been much slower com-
pared to the previous two decades: the 
1960s and 1970s  - the period associated 
with the Keynesian ‘golden age’. Welfare 
improvements have generally been much 
more modest since the 1980s. Poverty 
reduction has therefore been slower, with 
reduced growth and with worse distribu-
tion. It is true however, that the last five 
years have seen increased growth, includ-
ing in many developing countries. This has 
been an exceptional period, and much of it 
is due to two factors: 1) increased prices 
of primary commodities, and 2) the lower 
cost of finance because of the US Federal 
Reserve’s efforts to reduce interest rates 
in the US since 2001, affecting the entire 
international financial system. As a conse-
quence, there has been higher growth in 
many developing countries, but inequali-
ties have increased and poverty persists. 
There has been little significant reduction 
in overall rates of poverty. Another contrib-
uting factor is the new phenomenon often 
called ‘jobless growth’. In other words, 
there has been relatively little employment 
growth despite overall economic growth. 
And without employment growth, it is 
very difficult to conceive of poverty being 
reduced on a sustained basis.
Now, we come back to the significance of 
Asia. If you look at global trends in inter-
country inequality, there is no clear trend 
when you include China. But once you 
take China out of the picture, the picture 
changes radically and you have a huge 
increase in inequality at the global level. So 
the apparent lack of a clear trend in global 
inequality is largely due to China. The role 
of India is much less significant.
Defining poverty
Earlier, I suggested the significance of the 
definition of inequality; it is also impor-
tant how we define poverty, and poverty 
is defined variously by different important 
protagonists. For example, Martin Raval-
lion of the World Bank defines poverty 
using the ‘dollar a day’ benchmark. Sur-
jit S. Bhalla, a conservative economist in 
India, points out that the national income 
accounts are not compatible with income 
surveys. He claims that this incompatibil-
ity is a very recent phenomenon, and then 
argues that the World Bank is exaggerating 
the extent of poverty in the world to keep 
itself in business. In contrast, Amartya Sen 
suggests that it is not useful to use any 
kind of money-metric measure of poverty. 
Instead, he suggests that needs-fulfilment 
is the more useful measure. 
Following from this, we then have very 
different understandings of what consti-
tutes pro-poor growth. Martin Ravallion 
from the World Bank suggests that any 
growth (it does not matter how much) 
which increases the welfare of anyone con-
sidered poor, should be considered ‘pro-
poor’. Nanak Kakwani, until recently at the 
International Poverty Centre in Brasilia set 
up by the UNDP, suggests that for growth 
to be considered ‘pro-poor’, the share of 
growth accruing to the poor should be at 
least equal to the poor’s share of income. 
So, if, for example, the poor get 10 per-
cent of total income, for growth to be 
considered ‘pro-poor’, over 10 percent of 
growth or additional output should accrue 
to the poor. Woodward and Simms from 
the New Economics Foundation (nef) in 
London have a different definition which 
most mainstream economists would have 
great difficulty with. They suggest that for 
growth to be considered ‘pro-poor’, the 
share of growth should be at least equal 
to the poor’s share of the population. So, 
if the poor in a country constitute half the 
population, at least half of the additional 
output should accrue to the poor for it to 
be considered ‘pro-poor’. That, of course, 
is very unlikely to happen.
Making poverty history?
There is a tendency for poverty to contrib-
ute to a vicious cycle. When conditions are 
desperate, the likelihood of civil conflict 
taking place increases, and there seems 
to be a very strong relationship between 
poverty and the likelihood of civil conflict 
occurring. In 2005, the UN summit made 
a strong commitment to what are called 
the internationally agreed development 
goals, including  - but not only  - the Mil-
lennium Development Goals. The mem-
ber states of the UN felt that there was a 
need to re-commit to the broad range of 
commitments made during the 1990s 
and the first half of this decade. A strong 
commitment was made to encourage 
national development strategies which 
should involve far more national owner-
ship and policy space, and not to simply 
rely on the so-called poverty reduction 
strategies associated with the World Bank 
and the IMF. This was as a result of a gen-
eral recognition that the Bretton Woods 
institutions’ macro-economic framework 
is really wanting  - in terms of economic 
development and growth as well as in 
terms of human welfare. More than 75 per-
cent of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
do not even have an employment compo-
nent. It is inconceivable how one seriously 
expects to reduce poverty without increas-
ing employment. Unfortunately, however, 
we find that the global economic agenda 
continues to be dominated by the powerful 
countries in the world and the internation-
al institutions they control. Moreover, the 
agenda items often emphasised in world 
trade negotiations include questions such 
as trade liberalisation, foreign investment 
protection, capital account liberalisation, 
financial liberalisation more generally, and 
strengthened intellectual property rights -
- all of which contribute to slowing down 
development and exacerbating inequality 
and poverty. Meanwhile, the issues con-
sidered important to developing countries 
rarely make it to the international agenda 
for negotiations. The Doha round is now 
recognised as not being, in any serious 
sense of the word, developmental; the 
Washington consensus is certainly not 
considered to be developmental or equi-
table. International economic stability is 
generally acknowledged as having actually 
This is an extract from the Wertheim Lec-
ture delivered in Amsterdam on 21 May 
2007. Listen to the full lecture online at: 
http://www.iias.nl/index.php?q=audio
worsened in the last quarter century. There 
has been some progress in debt relief, but 
it is not very meaningful. Capital flight con-
tinues to be a huge problem, and the idea 
that international financial liberalisation 
can reverse capital flight is recognised as 
being far from reality. It is like opening a 
bird cage and expecting more birds to fly 
in, than to fly out. Finally, we find that the 
agenda for international economic govern-
ance continues to be dominated by the rich. 
So, if we are serious about making poverty 
history, we really need to study the history 
of development. There is a need to recog-
nise what is developmental, as opposed 
to what is palliative and welfare oriented 
(as important as that might be from a 
humanitarian point of view). There is a 
need to recognise that one size does not 
fit all. There is a need to eschew the main-
stream orthodoxy and to favour common 
sense, and to proceed with what might be 
termed cautious experimentation. For this, 
national ownership and policy space are 
crucial. Growth is necessary, but certainly 
not sufficient, and the questions of distri-
bution and accountability are generally rec-
ognised as important. National and inter-
national activism, I would like to suggest, 
are crucial. Coalitions involving civil soci-
ety, especially from both the North and the 
South, can make a huge difference in shap-
ing things - we have seen how discussions 
of international economic governance 
have changed, especially since Seattle. I 
think we owe Professor Wertheim a great 
deal in this regard. He stood for original 
and independent scholarship, but also a 
sustained partisan engagement and advo-
cacy to which we are all indebted; and very 
importantly, an element which I personally 
most appreciate – especially because it is 
so rare in academic circles - a humility and 
modesty, despite his greatness. 
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